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Abstract
Recommender system has attracted much atten-
tion during the past decade. Many attack detec-
tion algorithms have been developed for better
recommendations, mostly focusing on shilling at-
tacks, where an attack organizer produces a large
number of user profiles by the same strategy to
promote or demote an item. This work considers
a different attack style: unorganized malicious at-
tacks, where attackers individually utilize a small
number of user profiles to attack different items
without any organizer. This attack style occurs in
many real applications, yet relevant study remains
open. We first formulate the unorganized mali-
cious attacks detection as a matrix completion
problem, and propose the Unorganized Malicious
Attacks detection (UMA) approach, a proximal al-
ternating splitting augmented Lagrangian method.
We verify, both theoretically and empirically, the
effectiveness of our proposed approach.
1. Introduction
Online activities have been an essential part in our daily life
as the flourish of the Internet, e.g., increasing customers
prefer shopping on Amazon and eBay; lots of people enjoy
watching different movies and TV shows on Youtube and
Netflix, etc. There is a big challenge to recommend suitable
products effectively as the number of users and items in-
creases drastically; therefore, various collaborative filtering
techniques have been developed in diverse systems so as
to help customers choose their favorite products in a set of
items (Li et al., 2009; Bresler et al., 2014; Rao et al., 2015).
Many collaborative filtering approaches are vulnerable to
spammers and manipulations of ratings (Ling et al., 2013;
Gunes et al., 2014), and attackers may bias systems by in-
serting fake rating scores into the user-item rating matrix.
Some attackers may increase the popularity of their own
items (push attack) while some others may decrease the pop-
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ularity of their competitors’ items (nuke attack). Most attack
detection studies focus on shilling attacks and show good
detection performance on kinds of shilling attack strategies
(Mehta, 2007; Hurley et al., 2009; Ling et al., 2013). They
consider the situation that all the attack profiles are produced
by the same strategy to promote or demote a particular item.
For example, an attack organizer may produce hundreds of
fake user profiles by a strategy that each fake user profile
gives high scores to the most popular movies and low scores
to the target movie to demote it.
Various practical techniques have been developed to control
shilling attacks, e.g., online sites require real names and
telephone numbers for registrations; CAPTCHA is used
to determine that the response is not generated by a robot;
customers are allowed to rate a product after purchasing this
product on the shopping website. Based on these measures,
traditional shilling attacks may suffer high cost. For exam-
ple, small online sellers in e-commerce like Amazon might
not be willing to produce hundreds of fake customer rating
profiles to implement a shilling attack.
In this paper, we investigate a new attack model named
unorganized malicious attack, where attackers individually
use a small number of user profiles to attack their own
targets without any organizer. This attack style happens
in many real applications, e.g., online sellers on Amazon
may fake a few customer rating profiles to demote their
competitors’ high-quality shoes; writers may hire several
readers to give high scores to promote their low-quality
books. In fact, it has been shown that systems are seriously
affected by small amounts of unorganized malicious attacks,
e.g., the first maliciously bad rating can decrease the sales
of one seller by 13% (Luca, 2016).
We first formulate the unorganized malicious attacks de-
tection as a variant of matrix completion problem. Let X
denote the ground-truth rating matrix without attacks and
noises, and the matrix is low-rank since the users’ prefer-
ences are affected by several factors (Salakhutdinov et al.,
2007). Let Y be the sparse attack-score matrix, and Z
denotes a noisy matrix. What we can observe is a (or par-
tial) matrix M such that M = X + Y + Z. As far as we
know, previous works do not make similar formulation for
attack detection. The main difference between our optimiza-
tion problem and robust PCA (Cande`s et al., 2011) is that
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roubst PCA focuses on recovering low-rank part X from
complete or incomplete matrix and we pay more attention
to distinguishing the sparse attack term Y from the small
perturbation noise term Z.
Theoretically, we prove that the low-rank rating matrix X
and the sparse matrix Y can be recovered under some clas-
sical matrix-completion assumptions. We propose the Un-
organized Malicious Attacks detection (UMA) algorithm,
which can be viewed as a proximal alternating splitting
augmented Lagrangian method. Some new techniques have
been developed to prove its global convergence with a worst-
case O(1/t) convergence rate. Finally, experimental results
verify the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm in com-
parison with the state-of-the-art methods of attack detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews some related works. Section 3 introduces the frame-
work of unorganized malicious attacks detection, and Sec-
tion 4 proposes our UMA algorithm. Section 5 presents
theoretical justification for matrix recovery and convergence
of UMA. Section 6 shows our experiments, and Section 7
concludes this work.
2. Related Work
Collaborative filtering (CF) is one of the most successful
techniques to build recommender systems. The core as-
sumption of CF is that if users express similar interests
in the past, they will share common interest in the future
(Goldberg et al., 1992). Significant progress about CF has
been made since then (Salakhutdinov et al., 2007; Li et al.,
2009; Bresler et al., 2014; Rao et al., 2015). There are two
main categories of conventional CF (based on the user-item
rating matrix) which are memory-based and model-based
CF algorithms. Memory-based CF predicts a user’s rating
on an item based on the entire or part of the user-item ma-
trix. It can be subdivided into user-based and item-based
CF. A typical user-based CF approach predicts the ratings
of a user by aggregating the ratings of some similar users.
User similarity is defined by a similarity metric, usually the
cosine similarity or the Pearson correlation (Singhal, 2001).
Many modifications and adjustments about the similarity
metric have been proposed (Adomavicius & Singhal, 2005;
Zhang & Pu, 2007). Item-based CF approaches predict the
rating of an item for a user according to the ratings of items
the user has given (Deshpande & Karypis, 2004).
Model-based CF approaches use the user-item matrix to
train prediction models and recommendations are gener-
ated from the prediction models (Ekstrand et al., 2011).
For example, the mixture model learns the probability dis-
tribution of items in each clusters (Kleinberg & Sandler,
2008); Matrix factorization techniques learn latent factors
of users and items from the user-item matrix and then use
the low-rank approximation matrix to predict the score of un-
rated items; From probabilistic perspective, Salakhutdinov
& Mnih (2008a) propose probabilistic matrix factorization
framework. Considering about side information besides
the user-item matrix, many works expand the CF paradigm
(Basilico & Hofmann, 2004; Salakhutdinov et al., 2007).
However the two main categories of CF schemes are both
vulnerable to attacks (Gunes et al., 2014; Aggarwal, 2016).
Increasing attention has been given to attack detection. Re-
searchers have proposed several kinds of methods which can
be mainly thought as statistical, clustering, classification and
data reduction-based methods (Gunes et al., 2014). These
methods mainly focus on shilling attacks where the attack or-
ganizer produces a large number of user profiles by the same
strategy to promote or demote a particular item. Statistical
methods are used to detect anomalies who give suspicious
ratings. Hurley et al. (2009) propose a Neyman-Pearson sta-
tistical attack detection method to distinguish attackers from
normal users. Similarly, probabilistic Bayesian network
models are used in Li & Luo (2011). Based on attributes
derived from user profiles, classification methods detect at-
tacks by kNN, SVM, rough set theory, etc (Mobasher et al.,
2009; He et al., 2010).
An unsupervised clustering algorithm based on several clas-
sification attributes (Bryan et al., 2008) is presented in Bhau-
mik et al. (2011). They apply k-means clustering based on
these attributes and classify users in the smallest cluster
as attackers. Instead of using traditional nearest neighbor
methods, Mehta (2007) proposes a PLSA-based clustering
method. Mehta & Nejdl (2009) propose the variable selec-
tion method, which treats users as variables and calculates
their covariance matrix. By analyzing the principal compo-
nents of the covariance matrix, those users with the smallest
coefficient in the first l principal components are chosen in
the final variable selection. Ling et al. (2013) try to use a
low-rank matrix factorization method to predict the users’
ratings. Users’ reputation is computed according to the
predicted ratings and low-reputed users are classified as
malicious users.
These methods implement detection based on the common
characteristics of the attack profiles produced by the same
attack strategy. When recommender systems are under un-
organized malicious attacks, different attackers use different
strategies to produce attack profiles or hire existing users
to attack different targets. The traditional attack detection
methods may be not suitable in this case.
Recovering low-dimensioinal structrue from a corrupted
matrix is related to robust PCA (Cande`s et al., 2011; Yi et al.,
2016; Bouwmans et al., 2017). They focus on recovering
low-rank part X from complete or incomplete matrix, and
it is different from attacks detection (which is our task). We
pay more attention to distinguishing the sparse attack term
Unorganized Malicious Attacks Detection
Y from the small perturbation noise term Z.
3. The Formulation
In this section, we introduce the general form of an attack
profile, and then we give a detailed comparison of unorga-
nized malicious attacks and shilling attacks. The formal
definition of unorganized malicious attacks and the corre-
sponding detection problem formulation are also presented.
3.1. Notations
We begin with some notations used throughout this pa-
per. Let ‖X‖, ‖X‖F and ‖X‖∗ denote the operator norm,
Frobenius norm and nuclear norm of matrix X , respec-
tively. Let ‖X‖1 and ‖X‖∞ be the `1 and `∞ norm of
matrix X seen as a long vector, respectively. Further, we
define the Euclidean inner product between two matrices as
〈X,Y 〉 := trace(XY >), where Y > means the transposition
of Y . Therefore, We have ‖X‖2F = 〈X,X〉.
Let PΩ denote an operator of linear transformation which
acts on matrices space, and we also denote PΩ by the linear
space of matrices supported on Ω when it is clear from the
context. Then, PΩ> represents the space of matrices sup-
ported on Ωc. For an integer m, let [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
𝑖"# ⋯ 𝑖%# 𝑖"& ⋯ 𝑖'& 𝑖"∅ ⋯ 𝑖)∅ 𝑖*𝜃(𝑖"#) ⋯ 𝜃(𝑖%#) 𝜁(𝑖"&) ⋯ 𝜁(𝑖'&) 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 ⋯ 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 Υ(𝑖*)
𝐼# 𝐼& 𝐼∅
Ratings for 𝑘
selected items
Ratings for 𝑙
filler items
Unrated items in 
the attack profile
Ratings for the
target item
Figure 1. General form of an attack profile.
3.2. Problem Formulation
The general form of an attack profile is shown in Figure 1
which is first defined by Bhaumik et al. (2006). The attack
profile is partitioned in four parts. The null part, I∅, contains
the items with no ratings. The single target item it will be
given a malicious rating, i.e. a high rating in a push attack
and a low rating in a nuke attack. The selected items, IS ,
are a group of selected items for special treatment during
the attack. The filler items, IF , are selected randomly to
complete the attack profile. Functions θ, ζ and Υ determine
how ratings should be assigned to items in IS , IF and target
item it. Three basic attack strategies are listed bellow.
• Random attack: IS is empty, and IF is selected ran-
domly with function ζ generating random ratings cen-
tered around the overall average rating in the database.
• Average attack: IS is empty, and IF is selected ran-
domly with function ζ generating random ratings cen-
tered around the average rating for each item.
• Bandwagon attack: IS is selected from the popular
items and function θ gives IS high ratings. The filler
items are handled similarly to random attack.
In each shilling attack, one attack strategy is chosen, e.g.,
average attack strategy; the target item it is fixed; the num-
bers of rated items k and l are fixed; the rating functions
are fixed. This leads to the generated attack profiles having
some common characteristics in one shilling attack. Be-
sides, a large number of attack profiles is required in the
basic settings of shilling attacks.
However, in unorganized malicious attacks, the attack strate-
gies, the number of rated items, the target item and the rating
functions are not constrained to be the same. Besides, we
assume that each attacker produces a small number of attack
profiles. The formal definition of unorganized malicious
attacks is given in the following.
Let U[m] = {U1, U2, . . . , Um} and I[n] = {I1, I2, . . . , In}
denote m users and n items, respectively. Let X ∈ Rm×n
be the ground-truth rating matrix. Xij denotes the score
that user Ui gives item Ij without any attack or noise, i.e.,
Xij reflects the ground-truth feeling of user Ui on item Ij .
Suppose that the score range is [−R,R], then −R ≤ X ≤
R. Throughout this work, we assume that X is a low-rank
matrix as in classical matrix completion (Salakhutdinov &
Mnih, 2008b). The intuition behind this assumption is that
only a few factors influence users’ preferences.
Usually, the ground-truth matrix X may be corrupted by
a system noisy matrix Z. For example, if Xij = 4.8 for
i ∈ [m], then, it is acceptable that user Ui gives item Ij
score 5 or 4.6. In this paper, we consider the independent
Gaussian noise, i.e., Z = (Zij)m×n where each element
Zij is drawn i.i.d. from the Gaussian distribution N (0, σ)
with parameter σ.
LetM be the observed rating matrix. We define unorganized
malicious attacks as follows: for every j ∈ [n], |U j | < γ
where U j = {Ui|i ∈ [m] & |Mij −Xij | ≥ }. The param-
eter  is used to distinguish malicious users from the normal,
and the parameter γ limits the number of user profiles at-
tacking one item. Intuitively, unorganized malicious attacks
mean that attackers individually use a small number of user
profiles to attack their own targets. So multiple independent
shilling attacks where each contains a small number of at-
tack profiles can be regarded as an example of unorganized
malicious attacks.
It is necessary to distinguish unorganized malicious attacks
from noise. Generally speaking, user Ui gives item Ij a
normal score if |Mij − Xij | is very small, while user Ui
Unorganized Malicious Attacks Detection
makes an attack to item Ij if |Mij −Xij | ≥ . For example,
if the ground-truth score of item Ij is 4.8 for user Ui, then
user Ui makes a noisy rating by giving Ij score 5, yet makes
an attack by giving Ij score −3. Therefore, we assume that
‖Z‖F ≤ δ, where δ is a small parameter.
Let Y = M −X −Z = (Yij)m×n be the malicious-attack-
score matrix. Then, Yij = 0 if user Ui does not attack
item Ij , otherwise |Yij | ≥ . We assume that Y is a sparse
matrix, and the intuition behind this assumption is that the
ratio of malicious ratings to all the ratings is small. Notice
that we can not directly recover X and Y from M because
such recovery is an NP-Hard problem (Cande`s et al., 2011).
We consider the following optimization problem.
min
X,Y,Z
‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ
2
‖Y ‖2F
s.t. X + Y + Z = M,
‖Z‖F ≤ δ.
(1)
‖X‖∗ acts as a convex surrogate of the rank function. ‖Y ‖1
is used to induce the sparse attack component of M . The
term 〈M,Y 〉 is introduced to better distinguish Y and Z.
While each entry in Z is small and ZijMij can be either
positive or negative, the malicious rating bias Yij and the
observed rating Mij are usually the same as positive or
negative, i.e. MijYij > 0. Specifically, if it is a nuke attack,
Yij < 0 and Mij < 0; if it is a push attack, Yij > 0 and
Mij > 0. ‖Y ‖2F is another strongly convex regularizer for
Y . This term also guarantee that we can get the optimal
solution efficiently. τ , α and κ are tradeoff parameters.
In many real applications, we can not get a full matrix M ,
and only partial entries can be observed. Let Ω ∈ [m]× [n]
be the set of observed entries. We define an orthogonal
projection PΩ onto the linear space of matrices supported
on Ω ⊂ [m]× [n] as follows.
PΩM =
{
Mij for (i, j) ∈ Ω,
0 otherwise.
Our final optimization framework for unorganized malicious
attack detection can be formulated as follows.
min
X,Y,Z
‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ
2
‖Y ‖2F
s.t. PΩ(X + Y + Z) = PΩM,
‖PΩ(Z)‖F ≤ δ.
(2)
There have been many works focus on recovering low-rank
part X from complete or incomplete matrix (Cande`s et al.,
2011; Mackey et al., 2011; Peng et al., 2012; Feng et al.,
2013). However, we pay more attention to distinguishing
the sparse noise term Y from the small perturbation term Z.
In order to find nonzero entries of Y , a new term 〈M,Y 〉
is added which gets a much better performance. Further
details about the proposed approach, theoretical analysis
and experiments are explained below in Section 4, 5, 6.
4. The Proposed Approach
In this section, we propose a proximal alternating splitting
augmented Lagrangian method to solve the optimization
problem (2), which can guarantee global convergence.
The separable structure emerging in both the objective func-
tion and constrains in Eq. (2) enables us to derive an efficient
algorithm by splitting the optimization problem in appro-
priate ways. However, it is rather difficult to optimize this
problem with theoretical guarantee, because this optimiza-
tion involves three blocks variables. The existing literatures
have shown that the direct extension of the alternating di-
rection method of multipliers may not be convergent for
solving Eq. (2), e.g., (Chen et al., 2016).
Firstly, we reformulate Eq. (2) as follows,
min ‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ2 ‖Y ‖2F
s.t. X + Y + Z = PΩM,
Z ∈ B,
B := {Z|‖PΩ(Z)‖F ≤ δ},
(3)
where κ > 0 is a regularization parameter. As κ → 0 and
α→ 0, this formulation degenerates into robust PCA con-
sidering small dense noise. We further get the augmented
Lagrangian function as follows.
LA(X,Y, Z,Λ, β) := ‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉
+κ2 ‖Y ‖2F − 〈Λ, L〉+ β2 ‖L‖2F (4)
where L = X+Y +Z−PΩM and β is a positive constant.
It is noteworthy that traditional algorithms, e.g., (Tao &
Yuan, 2011; He et al., 2015) can not guarantee the conver-
gence for this three-block convex minimization problem.
We propose a proximal alternating splitting augmented La-
grangian method to decompose the optimization task of
Eq. (3) into three smaller ones which solve the variables
Zk+1, Xk+1 and Y k+1 separately in the consecutive order.
We will provide global convergence guarantee and conver-
gence rate for this algorithm in Section 5.
More specifically, let LA and B be defined in Eq. (3). With
given (Xk, Y k,Λk), we first update
Zk+1 = arg min
Z∈B
LA(Xk, Y k, Z,Λk, β),
and it is easy to get the closed form solution
Zk+1ij =
{
min{1, δ/‖PΩN‖F }Nij if (i, j) ∈ Ω
Nij otherwise
(5)
where N = 1βΛ
k + PΩM −Xk − Y k. Then, we update
Xk+1 = arg min
X∈Rm×n
LA(X,Y k, Zk+1,Λk, β),
and Lemma 2 gives the closed solution as
Xk+1 = D1/β(PΩM + 1
β
Λk − Y k − Zk+1) (6)
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Algorithm 1 The UMA Algorithm
Input: matrix M and parameters τ , α, β, δ and κ.
Output: Label vector [y1, . . . , ym] where yi = 1 if user Ui
is a malicious user; otherwise yi = 0.
Initialize: Y 0 = X0 = Λ0 = 0, yi = 0 (i = 1, . . . ,m),
k = 0
Process:
1: while not converged do
2: Compute Zk+1 by Eq. (5).
3: Compute Xk+1 by Eq. (6).
4: Compute Y k+1 by Eq. (7).
5: Update the Lagrange multiplier Λk+1 by
Λk − β(Xk+1 + Y k+1 + Zk+1 − PΩM).
6: k = k + 1.
7: end while
8: if max(|Yi,:|) > 0, then yi = 1 (i = 1, . . . ,m).
where the nuclear-norm-involved shrinkage operator D1/β
is defined in Lemma 2. Further, we update
Y k+1 = arg min
Y ∈Rm×n
LA(Xk+1, Y, Zk+1,Λk, β)
and Lemma 1 gives the closed solution Y k+1 as
Sτ/β(α+ β
β
PΩM +
1
β
Λk − Zk+1 −Xk+1)υβ (7)
where υ = 1/(β + κ) and the shrinkage operator Sτ/β is
defined in Lemma 1. Finally, we update
Λk+1 = Λk − β(Xk+1 + Y k+1 + Zk+1 − PΩM).
The pseudocode of the proposed UMA algorithm is given
in Algorithm 1.
5. Theoretical Analysis
This section presents our main theoretical results. Due to
the page limit, the detailed proofs and analysis are given in
the supplement document.
We begin with two useful lemmas for the deviation of our
proposed algorithm as follows.
Lemma 1 (Bruckstein et al., 2009) For τ > 0 and T ∈
Rm×n, the closed solution of minY τ‖Y ‖1 + ‖Y −T‖2F /2
is given by matrix Sτ (T ) with (Sτ (T ))ij = max{|Tij | −
τ, 0} · sgn(Tij), where sgn(·) means the sign function.
Lemma 2 (Cai et al., 2010) For µ > 0 and Y ∈ Rm×n
with rank r, the closed solution of minX µ‖X‖∗ + ‖X −
Y ‖2F /2 is given by
Dµ(Y ) = Sdiag(Sµ(Σ))D>
where Y = SΣD> denotes the singular value decomposi-
tion of Y , and Sµ(Σ) is defined in Lemma 1.
We now present theoretical guarantee that UMA can recover
the low-rank component X and the sparse component Y .
For simplicity, our theoretical analysis focuses on square
matrix, and it is natural to generalize our results to the
general rectangular matrices.
Let the singular value decomposition of X0 ∈ Rn×n be
given by
X0 = SΣD
> =
∑r
i=1
σisid
>
i
where r is the rank of matrixX0, σ1, . . . , σr are the positive
singular values, and S = [s1, . . . , sr] and D = [d1, . . . , dr]
are the left- and right-singular matrices, respectively. For
µ > 0, we assume
max
i
‖S>ei‖2 ≤ µr/n,
max
i
‖D>ei‖2 ≤ µr/n, (8)
‖SD>‖2∞ ≤ µr/n2.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the support set of Y0 be uniformly
distributed for all sets of cardinality k, and X0 satisfies
the incoherence condition given by Eq. (13). Let X and Y
be the solution of optimization problem given by Eq. (14)
with parameter τ = O(1/
√
n), κ = O(1/
√
n) and α =
O(1/n). For some constant c > 0 and sufficiently large n,
the following holds with probability at least 1− cn−10 over
the choice on the support of Y0,
‖X0 −X‖ ≤ δ and ‖Y0 − Y ‖F ≤ δ
if rank(X0)≤ ρrn/µ/log2n and k ≤ ρsn2, where ρr and
ρs are positive constant.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 6, we present the follow-
ing theorem for the minimization problem of Eq. (2).
Theorem 2 Suppose that X0 satisfies the incoherence con-
dition given by Eq. (13), and Ω is uniformly distributed
among all sets of size ω ≥ n2/10. We assume that each
entry is corrupted independently with probability q. Let
X and Y be the solution of optimization problem given by
Eq. (2) with parameter τ = O(1/
√
n) , κ = O(1/
√
n)
and α = O(1/n). For some constant c > 0 and suffi-
ciently large n, the following holds with probability at least
1− cn−10,
‖X0 −X‖F ≤ δ and ‖Y0 − Y ‖F ≤ δ
if rank(X0)≤ ρrn/µ/log2n and q ≤ qs, where ρr and qs
are positive constants.
Unorganized Malicious Attacks Detection
We now analyze the global convergence of the proposed
UMA algorithm. For simplicity, let U = (Z;X;Y ), V =
(X;Y ; Λ), W = (Z;X;Y ; Λ). We also define
θ(U) = ‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ
2
‖Y ‖2F
and Ψ(W ) = (−Λ;−Λ;−Λ;X + Y +Z −M). It follows
from Corollaries 28.2.2 and 28.3.1 of (Rockafellar, 2015)
that the solution set of Eq. (2) is non-empty. Then, let
W ∗ = ((Z∗)>, (X∗)>, (Y ∗)>, (Λ∗)>)> be a saddle point
of Eq. (2), and define V ∗ = ((X∗)>, (Y ∗)>, (Λ∗)>)>,W∗
as the solution set and V∗ := {V ∗|W ∗ ∈ W∗}.
Theorem 3 When β is restricted by
β ∈ (0, 2(√5− 2)κ), (9)
there exists a sufficient small scalar ε > 0 such that
κ−
√
5 + 2
2
β > 0, and κ− 1
2(
√
5− 2− ε)β > 0.
Then the sequence {V k} is bounded and ‖Y k − Y k+1‖2F +
‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F + ‖Λk − Λk+1‖2F → 0 as k →∞.
Theorem 4 Let {V k} and {W k} be the sequences gen-
erated by UMA. Assume that the penalty parameter β is
satisfied with Eq. (23). Then, we have
1. Any cluster point of {W k} is a solution point of (4).
2. The sequence {V k} converges to some V∞ ∈ V∗.
3. The sequence {Uk} converges to a solution point of
Eq. (2).
Note that the range for β in (Tao & Yuan, 2017) with con-
vergence guarantee is β ∈ (0, 0.4κ) for UMA solving (2).
However, we get a much larger range for the penalty param-
eter β in Eq. (23).
Next, we present a worst-case O(1/t) convergence rate
measured by the iteration complexity for UMA. Indeed, the
range of β to ensure the O(1/t) convergence rate is slightly
more restrictive than Eq. (23). Let us define
Uk+1t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
Uk+1 and W k+1t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
W k+1.
We define Xk+1t , Y
k+1
t and Z
k+1
t in the same way. Ob-
viously, W k+1t ∈ W because of the convexity of W . By
invoking Theorem 9, there exists a constant C such that
max
(‖Xk‖F , ‖Y k‖F , ‖Zk‖F , ‖Λ‖F ) ≤ C, ∀ k.
Theorem 5 For t iterations generated by UMA with β re-
stricted in β ∈ (0, (√33− 5)κ/2),
1) We have
θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U) + (W k+1t −W )>Ψ(W )
≤ 1
t
[
4βC‖X + Y + Z − PΩM‖F
+
1
2
‖V 1 − V ‖2Q +
7 +
√
33
8
β‖Y 1 − Y 0‖2F
]
,
with Q = (βI, 0, 0; 0, βI, 0; 0, 0, I/β).
2) There exists a constant c¯1 > 0 such that
‖Xk+1t + Y k+1t + Zk+1t − PΩM‖2 ≤
c¯1
t2
.
3) There exists a constant c¯2 > 0 such that
|θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U∗)| ≤
c¯2
t
.
6. Experiments
In this section, we compare our proposed approach UMA
with the state-of-the art approaches of attacks detection.
To evaluate the performance of attacks detection, we con-
sider three common evaluating metrics as the performance
measures: detection precision, recall and F1 (Gunes et al.,
2014). Precision measures the fraction of detected attack
profiles among all the detected profiles, while recall mea-
sures the fraction of detected attack profiles among all the
attack profiles. F1 is the harmonic mean of precision and
recall. These performance measures can be calculated as
follows,
Precision =
#true postives
#true postives + #false positives
Recall =
#true postives
#true postives + #false negatives
F1 =
2× precision× recall
precision + recall
in which # true positives is the number of attack profiles cor-
rectly detected as attacks, # false positives is the number of
normal profiles that are misclassified, and # false negatives
is the number of attack profiles that are misclassified.
6.1. Datasets
We first conduct our experiments on the common-used
datasets MovieLens 100K and MovieLens 1M collected
and released by GroupLens.3 These datasets are collected
from a non-commercial recommender system. It is more
likely that the users in this dataset are non-spam users. We
take the users already in the datasets as normal users. The
3http://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/.
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Table 1. Detection precision, recall and F1 compared with other algorithms on MovieLens 100K and MovieLens 1M which are under
unorganized malicious attacks based on a combination of traditional strategies.
Movielens 100K Movielens 1M
Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
UMA 0.934±0.003 0.883±0.019 0.908±0.011 0.739±0.009 0.785±0.023 0.761±0.016
RPCA 0.908±0.010 0.422±0.048 0.575±0.047 0.342±0.003 0.558±0.028 0.424±0.009
N-P 0.774±0.015 0.641±0.046 0.701±0.032 0.711±0.007 0.478±0.018 0.572±0.014
k-means 0.723±0.171 0.224±0.067 0.341±0.092 0.000±0.000 0.000±0.000 0.000±0.000
PCAVarSel 0.774±0.009 0.587±0.024 0.668±0.019 0.278±0.007 0.622±0.022 0.384±0.011
MF-based 0.911±0.009 0.814±0.008 0.860±0.009 0.407±0.005 0.365±0.004 0.385±0.005
Table 2. Detection precision, recall and F1 compared with other algorithms on MovieLens 100K and MovieLens 1M which are under
general unorganized malicious attacks.
Movielens 100K Movielens 1M
Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
UMA 0.929±0.013 0.865±0.032 0.896±0.022 0.857±0.005 0.733±0.003 0.790±0.002
RPCA 0.797±0.046 0.659±0.097 0.721±0.097 0.635±0.012 0.391±0.022 0.484±0.015
N-P 0.244±0.124 0.145±0.089 0.172±0.084 0.273±0.020 0.099±0.031 0.144±0.035
k-means 0.767±0.029 0.234±0.042 0.357±0.051 0.396±0.026 0.300±0.039 0.341±0.035
PCAVarSel 0.481±0.027 0.168±0.017 0.248±0.023 0.120±0.006 0.225±0.012 0.157±0.008
MF-based 0.556±0.023 0.496±0.021 0.524±0.022 0.294±0.012 0.264±0.010 0.278±0.011
rating scores range from 1 to 5, and we preprocess the data
by minus 3 to the [−2, 2] range. Dataset MovieLens 100K
contains 100000 ratings of 943 users over 1682 movies, and
Dataset MovieLens 1M contains 1000209 ratings of 6040
users over 3706 movies. We describe how to add attack
profiles in Section 6.3.
We also collect a real dataset Douban 10K with 35 attack
profiles identified by the Douban website, where registered
users record rating information over various films, books,
clothes, etc.4 We gather 12095 ratings of 213 users over
155 items. The rating scores range from 1 to 5, and we
preprocess the data by minus 3 to the [−2, 2] range. Among
all the 213 user profiles, 35 profiles are attack profiles.
6.2. Comparison Methods and Implementation Details
We compare with the state-of-the-art approaches for attack
detection and robust PCA as follows.
• N-P: A statistical algorithm which identifies attack pro-
files based on the Neyman-Pearson statistics (Hurley
et al., 2009).
• k-means: A cluster algorithm based on several classi-
fication attributes (Bhaumik et al., 2011). They apply
k-means clustering based on these attributes and clas-
sify users in the smallest cluster as malicious users.
4http://www.douban.com/.
• PCAVarSel: A PCA-based variable selection algo-
rithm. They detect malicious users according to the
covariance among users (Mehta & Nejdl, 2009).
• MF-based: A low-rank matrix factorization based rep-
utation estimation algorithm (Ling et al., 2013). They
regard low-reputed users as malicious users.
• RPCA: A low-rank matrix recovery method consider-
ing sparse and small perturbation noise (Cande`s et al.,
2011). Users with nonzero terms in the sparse compo-
nent are classified as malicious users.
In all the experiments, we set τ = 10/
√
m, α = 10/m and
δ =
√
mn/200. Because the scale of ratings is from -2 to
2, a rating can be viewed as a malicious rating if it deviates
from the ground-truth rating by more than 3; therefore, we
set parameter β = τ/3 as the entries of Y will be nullified
if they are smaller than τ/β according to Eq. (7). We set
κ = τ which is satisfied with the conditions for convergence,
i.e., β ∈ (0, (√33− 5)κ/2).
6.3. Comparison Results
In the first experiment, we add attack profiles into the
datasets MovieLens 100K and MovieLens 1M by a com-
bination of several traditional attack strategies. These tradi-
tional attack strategies include average attack strategy, ran-
dom attack strategy and bandwagon attack strategy which
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Table 3. Detection precision, recall and F1 compared with other
algorithms on dataset Douban 10K.
Methods Precision Recall F1
UMA 0.800 0.914 0.853
RPCA 0.535 0.472 0.502
N-P 0.250 0.200 0.222
k-means 0.321 0.514 0.396
PCAVarSel 0.240 0.343 0.282
MF-based 0.767 0.657 0.708
have been discussed in Section 3.2. Specifically, each at-
tacker randomly chooses one strategy to fake the user rating
profiles and promotes one item randomly selected from
items with average rating lower than 0. In line with the set-
ting of previous attack detection works, we set the filler ratio
(percentage of rated items in total items) as 0.01 and the
filler items are drawn from the top 10% most popular items.
We set the spam ratio (number of attack profiles/number
of all user profiles) as 0.2. Table 1 shows the experimental
results on datasets MovieLens 100K and MovieLens 1M
which are under unorganized malicious attacks based on a
combination of traditional strategies.
In the second experiment, we consider a more general case
of unorganized malicious attacks. Besides the profile injec-
tion attacks as mentioned above, attackers can hire existing
users to attack their targets. So we add these two kinds of
attacks into the datasets. We set spam ratio as 0.2, where
25% of the attack profiles are produced similar to the first
experiment, and 75% of the attack profiles are from existing
users by randomly changing the rating of one item lower
than 0 to 2. In this case, attacks are more difficult to be
detected, because the attack profiles are more similar to
normal user profiles. Table 2 demonstrates the comparison
results on datasets MovieLens 100K and MovieLens 1M
which are under general unorganized malicious attacks.
Table 3 shows the experiments on dataset Douban 10K.
The experimental results in Table 1, 2 and 3 show that our
proposed UMA approach achieves the best performance on
three measures: Precision, Recall and F1, and our approach
takes superiority in all datasets. It is easy to observe that
traditional attack detection approaches fail to work for unor-
ganized malicious attacks detection, because those methods
depend on the properties of shilling attacks, e.g., the k-
means method and N-P method work if the attack profiles
are similar in the view of the supervised features or their
latent categories, and the PCAVarSel method achieves good
performance only if attack profiles have more common un-
rated items than normal profiles. In summary, these methods
detect attacks by identifying some common characteristics
of the attack profiles. However, those good properties do
not exist in the unorganized malicious attacks.
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Figure 2. Detection precision and recall on MovieLens 100K un-
der unorganized malicious attacks. The spam ratio (number of
attack profiles/number of all user profiles) varies from 0.02 to 0.2.
The RPCA and MF-based methods try to find the ground-
truth rating matrix from the observed rating matrix, whereas
they hardly separate the sparse attack matrix from the noisy
matrix, and tend to suffer from low precision, especially on
large-scale and heavily sparse datasets.
Since different systems may contain different spam ratios
(number of attack profiles/number of all user profiles), we
compare our UMA algorithm with other methods by vary-
ing the spam ratio from 2% to 20% in Figure 2. Our UMA
approach achieves robust and better performance in differ-
ent spam ratios, whereas the comparison methods (except
the RPCA method) achieve worse performance for small
spam ratio, e.g., the N-P approach detects almost nothing.
Although the RPCA method is as stable as our method
UMA in different spam ratios, there is a performance gap
between RPCA and UMA which becomes bigger when the
dataset gets larger and sparser from MovieLens 100K to
MovieLens 1M.
7. Conclusion
The attack detection plays an important role to improve the
quality of recommendation, whereas most previous methods
focus on shilling attacks. The key to detect shilling attacks
is to find the common characteristics of the attack profiles
which are produced by the same attack strategy. However,
unorganized malicious attacks are produced by multiple
attack strategies to attack different targets. In this case,
previous works perform inefficiently. In this paper, we first
formulate the unorganized malicious attacks detection as a
variant of matrix completion problem. Then we propose the
UMA algorithm, and give the proof of its recovery guarantee
and global convergence. Experimental results show that
UMA achieves significantly better performance than the
state-of-the-art approaches of attack detection.
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Supplementary Material (Appendix)
A. Optimization Model of UMA
We consider the following optimization model:
min ‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ2 ‖Y ‖2F ,
s.t. X + Y + Z = M¯,
Z ∈ B,
B := {Z|‖PΩ(Z)‖F ≤ δ},
(10)
where κ > 0 is a regularization parameter and M¯ := PΩ(M). The model (10) is a three-block convex programming. We
define the Lagrangian function and augmented Lagrangian function of (10) as follows:
L(X,Y, Z,Λ, β) := ‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ
2
‖Y ‖2F − 〈Λ, X + Y + Z − M¯〉, (11)
LA(X,Y, Z,Λ, β) := ‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ
2
‖Y ‖2F − 〈Λ, X + Y + Z − M¯〉+
β
2
‖X + Y + Z − M¯‖2F , (12)
where β > 0 is the penalty parameter.
B. Recovery Guarantee
In this section, we present theoretical guarantee that UMA can recover the low-rank component X and the sparse component
Y . For simplicity, our theoretical analysis focuses on square matrix, and it is natural to generalize our results to the general
rectangular matrices.
Let the singular value decomposition of X0 ∈ Rn×n be given by
X0 = SΣD
> =
∑r
i=1
σisid
>
i
where r is the rank of matrix X0, σ1, . . . , σr are the positive singular values, and S = [s1, . . . , sr] and D = [d1, . . . , dr] are
the left- and right-singular matrices, respectively. For µ > 0, we assume
max
i
‖S>ei‖2 ≤ µr/n,
max
i
‖D>ei‖2 ≤ µr/n, (13)
‖SD>‖2∞ ≤ µr/n2.
Firstly, we consider the following optimization problem where all the entries of M can be observed.
min
X,Y,Z
‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ
2
‖Y ‖2F
s.t. X + Y + Z = M,
‖Z‖F ≤ δ.
(14)
Theorem 6 Suppose that the support set of Y0 be uniformly distributed for all sets of cardinality k, and X0 satisfies the
incoherence condition given by Eqn. (13). Let X and Y be the solution of optimization problem given by Eqn. (14) with
parameter τ = O(1/
√
n) , κ = O(1/
√
n) and α = O(1/n). For some constant c > 0 and sufficiently large n, the following
holds with probability at least 1− cn−10 over the choice on the support of Y0
‖X0 −X‖ ≤ δ and ‖Y0 − Y ‖F ≤ δ
if rank(X0)≤ ρrn/µ/log2n and k ≤ ρsn2, where ρr and ρs are positive constant.
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Proof:
Let Ω be the space of matrices with the same support as Y0, and let T denote the linear space of matrices
T := {SX∗ + Y D∗, X, Y ∈ Rn×r}.
We will first prove that, for ‖PΩPT ‖ ≤ 1/2, (X0, Y0) is the unique solution if there is a pair (W,F ) satisfying
SD∗ +W = τ(sgn(Y0) + F + PΩK) (15)
where PTW = 0 and ‖W‖ ≤ 1/2, PΩF = 0 and ‖F‖∞ ≤ 1/2 and ‖PΩK‖F ≤ 1/4. Notice that SD∗ + W0
is an arbitrary subgradient of ‖X‖∗ at (X0, Y0), and τ(sgn(Y0) + F0) − αM + κY0 is an arbitrary subgradient of
τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ‖Y ‖2F /2 at (X0, Y0). For any matrix H , we have, by the definition of subgradient,
‖X0 +H‖∗ + τ‖Y0 −H‖1 − α〈M,Y0 −H〉+ κ2 ‖Y0 −H‖2F
≥ ‖X0‖∗ + τ‖Y0‖1 − α〈M,Y0〉+ κ2 ‖Y0‖2F + 〈αM − κY0, H〉
+ 〈SD∗ +W0, H〉 − τ〈sgn(Y0) + F0, H〉. (16)
By setting W0 and F0 satisfying 〈W0, H〉 = ‖PT⊥H‖∗ and 〈F0, H〉 = −‖PΩ⊥H‖1, we have
〈SD∗ +W0, H〉 − τ〈sgn(Y0) + F0, H〉
= ‖PT⊥H‖∗ + τ‖PΩ⊥H‖1 + 〈SD∗ − τsgn(Y0), H〉
= ‖PT⊥H‖∗ + τ‖PΩ⊥H‖1 + 〈τ(F + PΩK)−W,H〉
≥ 1
2
(‖PT⊥H‖∗ + τ‖PΩ⊥H‖1) + τ〈PΩD,H〉 (17)
where the second equality holds from Eqn. (15), and the last inequality holds from
〈τF −W,H〉 ≥ −|〈W,H〉| − |〈τF,H〉| ≥ −(‖PT⊥H‖∗ + τ‖PΩ⊥H‖1)/2
for ‖W‖ ≤ 1/2 and ‖F‖∞ ≤ 1/2. We further have
〈τPΩK,H〉 ≥ −τ
4
‖PΩ⊥H‖F −
τ
2
‖PT⊥H‖F (18)
from ‖PΩK‖F ≤ 1/4 and
‖PΩH‖F ≤ ‖PΩPTH‖F + ‖PΩPT⊥H‖F ≤ ‖PΩPT⊥H‖F
+ ‖H‖F /2 ≤ (‖PΩH‖F + ‖PΩ⊥H‖F )/2 + ‖PΩPT⊥H‖F .
Combing with Eqns. (16) to (18), we have
‖X0 +H‖∗ + τ‖Y0 −H‖1 − α〈M,Y0 −H〉+ κ2 ‖Y0 −H‖2F
≥ ‖X0‖∗ + τ‖Y0‖1 − α〈M,Y0〉+ κ2 ‖Y0 −H‖2F
+〈αM − κY0, H〉+ 1−τ2 ‖PT⊥H‖∗ + τ4‖PΩ⊥H‖1
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From the conditions that Ω ∩ T = {0}, τ = O(1/√n), κ = O(1/√n) and α = O(1/n), we have
α〈Y0 −X0, H〉+ 1− τ
2
‖PT⊥H‖∗ +
τ
4
‖PΩ⊥H‖1 > 0
for sufficient large n. Therefore, we can recover X0 and Y0 if there is a pair (W,F ) satisfying Eqn. (15), and the pair (W,F )
can be easily constructed according to (Cande`s et al., 2011). We complete the proof from the condition ‖Z‖F ≤ δ.

Similarly to the proof of Theorem 6, we present the following theorem for the minimization problem of Eqn. (10).
Theorem 7 Suppose that X0 satisfies the incoherence condition given by Eqn. (13), and Ω is uniformly distributed among
all sets of size m ≥ n2/10. We assume that each entry is corrupted independently with probability q. Let X and Y be the
solution of optimization problem given by Eqn. (10) with parameter τ = O(1/
√
n) , κ = O(1/
√
n) and α = O(1/n). For
some constant c > 0 and sufficiently large n, the following holds with probability at least 1− cn−10
‖X0 −X‖F ≤ δ and ‖Y0 − Y ‖F ≤ δ
if rank(X0)≤ ρrn/µ/log2n and q ≤ qs, where ρr and qs are positive constants.
C. Optimality condition
Before starting to show the convergence, we derive its optimality condition of (10). LetW := B×Rm×n×Rm×n×Rm×n.
It follows from Corollaries 28.2.2 and 28.3.1 of (Rockafellar, 2015) that the solution set of (10) is non-empty. Then, let
W ∗ = ((Z∗)>, (X∗)>, (Y ∗)>, (Λ∗)>)> be a saddle point of (10). It is easy to see that (10) is equivalent to finding
W ∗ ∈ W such that
〈Z − Z∗,−Λ∗〉 ≥ 0,
‖X‖∗ − ‖X∗‖∗ + 〈X −X∗,−Λ∗〉 ≥ 0,
τ‖Y ‖1 − τ‖Y ∗‖1 + 〈Y − Y ∗,−αM + κY ∗ − Λ∗〉 ≥ 0,
X∗ + Y ∗ + Z∗ − M¯ = 0,
∀W = (Z>, X>, Y >,Λ>)> ∈ W, (19)
or, in a more compact form:
VI(W,Ψ, θ) θ(U)− θ(U∗) + 〈W −W ∗,Ψ(W ∗)〉 ≥ κ
2
‖Y − Y ∗‖2F , ∀W ∈ W,
where
U =
 ZX
Y
 , θ(U) = ‖X‖∗ + τ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+ κ
2
‖Y ‖2F ,
and W =

Z
X
Y
Λ
 , V =
 XY
Λ
 , Ψ(W ) =

−Λ
−Λ
−Λ
X + Y + Z − M¯
 .
Note that U collects all the primal variables in (19) and it is a sub-vector of W . Moreover, we useW∗ to denote the solution
set of VI(W,Ψ, θ) and define V ∗ = ((X∗)>, (Y ∗)>, (Λ∗)>)> and V∗ := {V ∗|W ∗ ∈ W∗}.
D. Convergence Analysis
In this section, we solve (10) with global convergence. More specifically, let (Xk, Y k,Λk) be given, UMA generates the
new iterate W k+1 via the following scheme:
Zk+1 = arg minZ∈B LA(Xk, Y k, Z,Λk, β),
Xk+1 = arg minX∈Rm×n LA(X,Y k, Zk+1,Λk, β),
Y k+1 = arg minY ∈Rm×n LA(Xk+1, Y, Zk+1,Λk, β),
Λk+1 = Λk − β(Xk+1 + Y k+1 + Zk+1 − M¯),
(1)
Unorganized Malicious Attacks Detection
which can be easily written into the following more specific form:
Zk+1 = arg minZ∈B
β
2
‖Z +Xk + Y k − 1
β
Λk − M¯‖2F , (2a)
Xk+1 = arg minX∈Rm×n‖X‖∗ +
β
2
‖X + Y k + Zk+1 − 1
β
Λk − M¯‖2F , (2b)
Y k+1 = arg minY ∈Rm×nτ‖Y ‖1 − α〈M,Y 〉+
κ
2
‖Y ‖2F +
β
2
‖Y +Xk+1 + Zk+1 − 1
β
Λk − M¯‖2F , (2c)
Λk+1 = Λk − β(Xk+1 + Y k+1 + Zk+1 − M¯). (2d)
In the following, we concentrate on the convergence of UMA. In contrast to the existing results in (Tao & Yuan, 2017), we
aim to present a much more sharp result. We first prove some properties of the sequence generated by UMA, which play a
crucial role in the coming convergence analysis. Before that, we introduce some notations:
∆Λ :=
1
2β
(‖Λk+1 − Λ∗‖2F − ‖Λk − Λ∗‖2F + ‖Λk+1 − Λk‖2F ), (3)
∆X :=
1
2β
(‖Xk+1 −X∗‖2F − ‖Xk −X∗‖2F + ‖Xk+1 −Xk‖2F ), (4)
∆Y :=
1
2β
(‖Y k+1 − Y ∗‖2F − ‖Y k − Y ∗‖2F + ‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F ), (5)
R = X + Y + Z − M¯, (6)
Rk+1 = Xk+1 + Y k+1 + Zk+1 − M¯. (7)
Lemma 3 Let {W k} be generated by UMA. Then, we have
(1)
〈Λk − Λk+1, Y k − Y k+1〉 ≥ κ‖Y k − Y k+1‖2F . (8)
(2)
〈Λk − Λk+1, Xk −Xk+1〉 ≥ −β〈Xk −Xk+1, Y k+1 − Y k − (Y k − Y k−1)〉 (9)
Proof: (1) Using the optimality of (2c), we get
〈Y − Y k+1, ∂(τ‖Y k+1‖1)− Λk+1 − αM + κY k+1〉 ≥ 0. (10)
Setting Y := Y k in (10), we have
〈Y k − Y k+1, ∂(τ‖Y k+1‖1)− Λk+1 − αM + κY k+1〉 ≥ 0. (11)
Then, setting Y := Y k+1 in (10) with the index k replaced with k − 1, it yields
〈Y k+1 − Y k, ∂(τ‖Y k‖1)− Λk − αM + κY k〉 ≥ 0. (12)
Thus, adding (11) and (12) together, the inequality (8) follows directly.
(2) The inequality (9) can be proved in a similar way as (8). 
Lemma 4 Let {W k} be generated by UMA. Then, we have the following inequality:
θ(U)− θ(Uk+1) + 〈W −W k+1,Ψ(W k+1)〉+ β〈R,Γ(Xk, Y k, Zk)〉
≥ β
2
(‖V k+1 − V ‖2Q + ‖V k − V k+1‖2Q − ‖V k − V ‖2Q) + κ‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F +
κ
2
‖Y k+1 − Y ‖2F
−β〈Xk+1 −Xk, Y k+1 − Y k − (Y k − Y k−1)〉
+β〈Y k+1 − Y,Xk+1 −Xk〉. (13)
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where
Γ(Xk, Y k, Zk) = Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1,
Q =
 βI 0 00 βI 0
0 0 1β I
 (14)
Proof: According to the optimality condition of (1), we have
〈Z − Zk+1,−Λk+1 + β(Xk −Xk+1) + β(Y k − Y k+1)〉 ≥ 0,
‖X‖∗ − ‖Xk+1‖∗ + 〈X −Xk+1,−Λk+1 + β(Y k − Y k+1〉 ≥ 0,
τ‖Y ‖1 − τ‖Y k+1‖1 + 〈Y − Y k+1,−αM + κY k+1 − Λk+1〉 ≥ 0,
〈Λ− Λk+1, Xk+1 + Y k+1 + Zk+1 − M¯ − 1β (Λk − Λk+1)〉 ≥ 0,
∀W = (Z>, X>, Y >,Λ>)> ∈ W. (15)
Then, combining the above inequalities with (20) and (20), we get
θ(U)− θ(Uk+1) + 〈W −W k+1,Ψ(W k+1)〉+ β (〈Z − Zk+1, Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1〉
+β〈X −Xk+1, Y k − Y k+1〉) ≥ 1
2β
∆Λ +
κ
2
‖Y − Y k+1‖2F .
Then, invoking (6) and (7), we obtain that
θ(U)− θ(Uk+1) + 〈W −W k+1,Ψ(W k+1)〉+ β〈R −Rk+1, Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1〉
≥ κ
2
‖Y − Y k+1‖2F +
1
2β
∆Λ +
β
2
(∆X + ∆Y ) + β〈Y − Y k+1, Xk −Xk+1〉.
Thus, usingRk+1 = 1β (Λk − Λk+1), it yields that
θ(U)− θ(Uk+1) + 〈W −W k+1,Ψ(W k+1)〉+ β〈R, Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1〉
≥ κ
2
‖Y − Y k+1‖2F +
1
2β
∆Λ +
β
2
(∆X + ∆Y ) + β〈Y − Y k+1, Xk −Xk+1〉
+
1
β
〈Λk − Λk+1, Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1〉. (16)
On the other hand, adding (8) and (9) together, we obtain that
〈Λk − Λk+1, Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1〉 ≥ κ‖Y k − Y k+1‖2F − β〈Xk+1 −Xk, Y k+1 − Y k − (Y k − Y k−1)〉.
Next, substituting the above inequality into (16), and invoking, it yields the assertion (13).

In the following, we give each crossing term in the right-hand of (13) a low bound. The following inequalities enable us to
get a much sharper result for UMA solving (10) in contrast to ((Tao & Yuan, 2017)).
Lemma 5 Let {W k} be generated by UMA. Suppose that 0 < ε < √5− 2. Then, it holds that
− β〈Xk+1 −Xk, Y k+1 − Y k〉 ≥ β
(
−3−
√
5
4
‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F −
1
3−√5‖Y
k+1 − Y k‖2F
)
, (17)
β〈Xk+1 −Xk, (Y k − Y k−1)〉 ≥ β
(
−3−
√
5
4
‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F −
1
3−√5‖Y
k − Y k−1‖2F
)
, (18)
β〈Y k+1 − Y,Xk+1 −Xk〉 ≥ −β
(
1
2(
√
5− 2− ε)‖Y
k+1 − Y ‖2F +
√
5− 2− ε
2
‖Xk+1 −Xk‖2F
)
. (19)
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Proof: These three inequalities follow from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Theorem 8 Let {W k} be generated by UMA. Assume that β > 0 in Algorithm (1). Suppose that 0 < ε < √5− 2. Then,
we have the following contractive property:
β
2
‖Xk+1 −X∗‖2F +
β
2
‖Y k+1 − Y ∗‖2F +
1
2β
‖Zk+1 − Z∗‖2F +
β
3−√5‖Y
k − Y k+1‖2F
≤ β
2
‖Xk −X∗‖2F +
β
2
‖Y k − Y ∗‖2F +
1
2β
‖Zk − Z∗‖2F +
β
3−√5‖Y
k−1 − Y k‖2F
−ε
2
β‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F − (κ−
√
5 + 2
2
β)‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F −
1
2β
‖Λk − Λk+1‖2F
+(κ− 1
2(
√
5− 2− ε)β )‖Y
k+1 − Y ∗‖2F . (20)
Proof: First, invoking (20) and X∗ + Y ∗ + Z∗ − M¯ = 0, we have
θ(Uk+1)− θ(U∗) + 〈W k+1 −W ∗,Ψ(W k+1)〉+ β〈X∗ + Y ∗ + Z∗ − M¯,Γ(Xk, Y k, Zk)〉
≤ −κ
2
‖Y k+1 − Y ∗‖2F . (21)
Then, setting W := W ∗ ∈ W∗ in (13) and combining with (21), we obtain that
0 ≥ β
2
(‖V k+1 − V ∗‖2Q + ‖V k − V k+1‖2Q − ‖V k − V ∗‖2Q) + κ‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F + κ‖Y k+1 − Y ∗‖2F
−β〈Xk+1 −Xk, Y k+1 − Y k − (Y k − Y k−1) + β〈Y k+1 − Y,Xk+1 −Xk〉. (22)
Next, adding (17)-(19) together, then substituting the resulting inequality into (22), we derive the assertion (20) directly.
Based on the above theorem, we have the following theorem immediately.
Theorem 9 When β is restricted by
β ∈
(
0, 2(
√
5− 2)κ
)
, (23)
there exists a sufficient small scalar ε > 0 such that
κ−
√
5 + 2
2
β > 0, and κ− 1
2(
√
5− 2− ε)β > 0. (24)
Then, we have
(1) The sequence {V k} is bounded.
(2) limk→∞{‖Y k − Y k+1‖2F + ‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F + ‖Λk − Λk+1‖2F } = 0.
Proof. The inequality (24) is elementary. Note that the assertion (1) follows from (20) directly. Furthermore, we get
∞∑
k=1
[
ε
2
β‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F + (κ−
√
5 + 2
2
β)‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F +
1
2β
‖Λk − Λk+1‖2F
]
≤ β
2
‖X1 −X∗‖2F +
β
2
‖Y 1 − Y ∗‖2F +
1
2β
‖Z1 − Z∗‖2F +
β
3−√5‖Y
0 − Y 1‖2F < +∞,
which immediately implies that
lim
k→∞
‖Y k − Y k+1‖F = 0, lim
k→∞
‖Xk −Xk+1‖F = 0, lim
k→∞
‖Λk − Λk+1‖F = 0, (25)
i.e., the second assertion. 
We are now ready to prove the convergence of UMA.
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Theorem 10 Let {V k} and {W k} be the sequences generated by UMA. Assume that the penalty parameter β is satisfied
with (23). Then, we have
1. Any cluster point of {W k} is a solution point of (19).
2. The sequence {V k} converges to some V∞ ∈ V∗.
3. The sequence {Uk} converges to a solution point of (10).
Proof: Since {W k} is bounded due to (20), it has at least one cluster point. Let W∞ be a cluster point of {W k} and the
subsequence {W kj} converges to W∞. Because of the assertion (25), it follows from (15) that
〈Z − Z∞,−Λ∞〉 ≥ 0,
‖X‖∗ − ‖X∞‖∗ + 〈X −X∞,−Λ∞〉 ≥ 0,
τ‖Y ‖1 − τ‖Y∞‖1 + 〈Y − Y∞,−αM + κY∞ − Λ∞〉 ≥ 0,
〈Λ− Λ∞, X∞ + Y∞ + Z∞ − M¯〉 ≥ 0,
∀W = (Z>, X>, Y >,Λ>)> ∈ W.
Thus,
θ(U)− θ(U∞) + (W −W∞)>Ψ(W∞) ≥ κ
2
‖Y − Y∞‖2F , ∀W = (Z>, X>, Y >,Λ>)> ∈ W.
This means that W∞ is a solution of VI(W,Ψ, θ). Then the inequality (20) is also valid if V ∗ is replaced by V∞.
Therefore, the non-increasing sequence { 12‖V k−V∞‖2Q+ β3−√5‖Y k−Y k+1‖2F } converges to 0 since it has a subsequence
{ 12‖V kj −V∞‖2Q + β3−√5‖Y kj −Y kj+1‖2F } converges to 0. Thus, the sequence {V k} converges to some V∞ ∈ V∗. Also,
the updating scheme of Λk+1 in (1) implies that
Zk+1 = M¯ −Xk+1 − Y k+1 + 1
β
(Λk − Λk+1).
Combining the above equality, (25) and limk→∞ ‖V k − V∞‖2Q = 0, we have W k converges to W∞. It implies that the
sequence Uk converges to a solution point of (10). Thus, the third assertion holds. 
Remark 11 Note that the range for β in ((Tao & Yuan, 2017)) with convergence guarantee is (0, 0.4κ) for UMA solving
(10). However, we get a much larger range for the penalty parameter β in (23).
Next, we present a worst-case O(1/t) convergence rate measured by the iteration complexity for UMA. Indeed, the range of
β to ensure the O(1/t) convergence rate is slightly more restrictive than (23). Let us define
Zk+1t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
Zk+1, Xk+1t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
Xk+1, Y k+1t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
Y k+1, and Uk+1t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
Uk+1, W k+1t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
W k+1.
Obviously, W k+1t ∈ W because of the convexityW . By invoking Theorem 9, there exists a constant C such that
max
(‖Xk‖F , ‖Y k‖F , ‖Zk‖F , ‖Λk‖F ) ≤ C, ∀ k.
Next, we present several lemmas to facilitate the convergence rate analysis.
Lemma 6 Let {W k} be generated by UMA. Suppose that 0 < ε < √33− 5. Then, it holds that
− β〈Xk+1 −Xk, Y k+1 − Y k〉 ≥ β
(
−7−
√
33
8
‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F −
7 +
√
33
8
‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F
)
, (26)
β〈Xk+1 −Xk, (Y k − Y k−1)〉 ≥ β
(
−7−
√
33
8
‖Xk −Xk+1‖2F −
7 +
√
33
8
‖Y k − Y k−1‖2F
)
, (27)
β〈Y k+1 − Y,Xk+1 −Xk〉 ≥ −β
(
1√
33− 5− ε‖Y
k+1 − Y ‖2F +
√
33− 5− ε
4
‖Xk+1 −Xk‖2F
)
. (28)
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Proof: These three inequalities follow from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Lemma 7 Let {W k} be the sequence generated by UMA (1). If β is restricted by
β ∈
(
0,
√
33− 5
2
κ
)
, (29)
then we have
Θ(V k+1, V k, V ) ≤ Θ(V k, V k−1, V ) + Ξ(W k+1,W k,W ), (30)
where
Θ(V k+1, V k, V ) :=
1
2
‖V k+1 − V ‖2Q +
7 +
√
33
8
β‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F . (31)
and
Ξ(W k+1,W k,W ) := θ(U)− θ(Uk+1) + (W −W k+1)>Ψ(W ) + β〈R, Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1〉. (32)
Proof: First, summing inequalities (26)-(28) together, we get
β〈Xk+1 −Xk, Y k+1 − Y k − (Y k − Y k−1)〉+ β〈Y k+1 − Y,Xk+1 −Xk〉
≥ ε− 2
4
β‖Xk+1 −Xk‖2F −
7 +
√
33
8
β‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F
−7 +
√
33
8
β‖Y k − Y k−1‖2F −
1√
33− 5− εβ‖Y
k+1 − Y ‖2F .
Then, substituting the above inequality into (13) and invoking (31), (32), we obtain
Θ(V k+1, V k, V ) ≤ Θ(V k, V k−1, V ) + Ξ(W k+1,W k,W )−Xk‖2F − (κ−
5 +
√
33
4
β)‖Y k+1 − Y k‖2F
−β
4
ε‖Xk+1 − 1
2β
‖Λk − Λk+1‖2F − (
κ
2
− 1√
33− 5− εβ)‖Y
k+1 − Y ‖2F .
Let ε→ 0+, the assertion follows directly. 
Theorem 12 For t iterations generated by UMA with β restricted in the following assertions holds.
(1) We have
θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U) + (W k+1t −W )>Ψ(W )
≤ 1
t
[
4βC‖X + Y + Z − M¯‖F + 1
2
‖V 1 − V ‖2Q +
7 +
√
33
8
β‖Y 1 − Y 0‖2F
]
. (33)
(2) There exists a constant c¯1 > 0 such that
‖Xk+1t + Y k+1t + Zk+1t − M¯‖2 ≤
c¯1
t2
. (34)
(3) There exists a constant c¯2 > 0 such that
|θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U∗)| ≤
c¯2
t
. (35)
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Proof: 1) First, it follows from the assertion (30) that for all W ∈ W , we have
θ(U)− θ(Uk+1) + (W −W k+1)>Ψ(W ) + β〈R, Y k − Y k+1 +Xk −Xk+1〉
≥ Θ(V k+1, V k, V )−Θ(V k, V k−1, V ). (36)
Summarizing both sides of the above inequalities from k = 1, 2, · · · , t, we have
tθ(U)−
t∑
k=1
θ(Uk+1) + (tW −
t∑
k=1
W k+1)>Ψ(W ) + β〈R, Y 1 − Y t+1 +X1 −Xt+1〉
≥ Θ(V t+1, V t, V )−Θ(V 1, V 0, V ). (37)
Then, it follows from the convexity of θ that
θ(Uk+1t ) ≤
1
t
t∑
k=1
θ(Uk+1). (38)
Combining (37) and (38), we have
θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U) + (W k+1t −W )>Ψ(W ) ≤
1
t
(
Θ(V 1, V 0, V ) + 4βC‖R‖F
)
. (39)
Thus, the assertion (33) follows from the above inequality and the defintion of Θ(V 1, V 0, V ) directly.
2) Let us define c¯1 = 2β2
(‖Λ1 − Λ∗‖2 + ‖Λk+1 − Λ∗‖2). Then, we have
‖Xk+1t + Y k+1t + Zk+1t − M¯‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
k=1
[
Xk+1 + Y k+1 + Zk+1 − M¯]∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥1t
t∑
k=1
[
1
β
(Λk − Λk+1)
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥ 1tβ (Λ1 − Λt+1)
∥∥∥∥2 ≤ 2t2β2 (‖Λ1 − Λ∗‖2 + ‖Λk+1 − Λ∗‖2) = c¯1t2 ,
The assertion (34) is proved immediately.
3) It follows from L(Uk+1t ,Λ∗) ≥ L(U∗,Λ∗) with L defined in (11) that
θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U∗) ≥ 〈Λ∗, Xk+1t + Y k+1t + Zk+1t − M¯〉
≥ −1
2
(
1
t
‖Λ∗‖2 + t‖Xk+1t + Y k+1t + Zk+1t − M¯‖2
)
≥ − 1
2t
(‖Λ∗‖2 + c¯1), (40)
where the second inequality is due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and the last is due to (34). On the other hand, setting
W := W ∗ in (39), we obtain
θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U∗) + 〈W k+1t −W ∗,Ψ(W ∗)〉 ≤
1
t
Θ(V 1, V 0, V ∗).
Invoking the definition of Ψ in (20), we have
(W k+1t −W ∗)>Ψ(W ∗) = −〈Λ∗, Xk+1t + Y k+1t + Zk+1t − M¯〉 ≥ −
1
2t
(‖Λ∗‖2 + c¯1),
where the proof of the last inequality is similar to (40). Combining these two inequalities above, we get
θ(Uk+1t )− θ(U∗) ≤
1
t
Θ(V 1, V 0, V ∗) +
1
2t
(‖Λ∗‖2 + c¯1). (41)
The inequalities (40) and (41) indicate that the assertion (35) holds by setting c¯2 := Θ(V 1, V 0, V ∗) + 12 (‖Λ∗‖2 + c¯1). 
